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 34 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND THE ROLE OF 
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE TRANSFORMATIVE 
POTENTIAL OF DOE v. SNYDER 
MELISSA HAMILTON* 
Abstract: In late 2016, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit’s concluded 
in Does #1–5 v. Snyder that Michigan’s sex offender registry and residency re-
striction law constituted an ex post facto punishment in violation of the constitu-
tion. In its decision, the Sixth Circuit engaged with scientific evidence that re-
futes moralized judgments about sex offenders, specifically that they pose a 
unique and substantial risk of recidivism. This Essay is intended to highlight the 
importance of Snyder as an example of the appropriate use of scientific studies in 
constitutional law. 
INTRODUCTION 
In late 2016, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit ruled in Does 
#1–5 v. Snyder (“Doe v. Snyder” or “Snyder”) that Michigan’s civil sex offend-
er law was unconstitutional.1 The Sixth Circuit’s decision attracted commen-
tary across the legal, policy, and media worlds.2 The ruling concludes that a 
state’s sex offender registry and residency restriction law constitutes an ex post 
facto punishment in violation of the constitution. The Sixth Circuit’s stance in 
Snyder conflicts with the judgments of nearly all other courts, which have 
largely rejected various constitutional challenges to specialized sex offender 
laws and policies. 
Several criminal law experts and news reporters anticipate that Snyder 
signals much more than an ex post facto issue.3 These commentators are likely 
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 1 Does #1–5 v. Snyder, 834 F.3d 696, 705–06 (6th Cir. 2016). 
 2 See, e.g., Fred Barbash, Court Says Michigan Sex Offender Registry Laws Creating “Moral 
Lepers,” WASH. POST (Aug. 26, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/
2016/08/26/court-mich-treating-sex-offenders-as-moral-lepers-restrictions-struck-down/ [https://
perma.cc/LNR5-RHAD]; Jesse Singal, Judges Are Starting to Question Overzealous Sex-Offender 
Laws, N.Y. MAG. (Aug. 29, 2016, 3:35 PM), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2016/08/judges-
are-questioning-overzealous-sex-offender-laws.html [https://perma.cc/UA76-3D6G]. 
 3 See, e.g., Mark Joseph Stern, Federal Appeals Court Strikes Down Absurdly Repressive North 
Carolina Sex Offender Law, SLATE (Dec. 2, 2016, 1:25 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/xx_factor/
2016/12/02/federal_appeals_court_strikes_down_north_carolina_sex_offender_law.html [https://
perma.cc/RA9U-D3W8]; Jacob Sullum, Two Federal Courts Call BS on Banning Sex Offenders from 
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correct to highlight the opinion’s potential to invite other courts to take a stand 
against sex offender registration and residency restriction regimes that have 
been myopically enacted by politicians. 
What this conversation is missing, however, is an appreciation of the 
Sixth Circuit’s engagement with relevant statistical studies within its constitu-
tional analysis. The common legislative presumption underlying sex offender 
registry laws and residency restrictions is that sex offenders remain a highly 
dangerous group, and are far more likely to recidivate than other types of of-
fenders. The Snyder opinion, instead, severely criticizes specialized sex of-
fender laws, declaring them ill-suited to their intended purpose of protecting 
the public. To this end, the Sixth Circuit expressly recognizes scientific studies 
showing that sex offenders as a group do not pose a significant recidivism risk. 
This Essay is intended to highlight the importance of Snyder as an exam-
ple of the appropriate use of scientific studies in constitutional law. In other 
words, Snyder makes a contemporary case for the relevance in constitutional 
decision-making of data gathered from interdisciplinary scientific fields, par-
ticularly where such data conflict with legislative assumptions. 
I. “CIVIL” SEX OFFENDER LAWS 
In the United States, sex offenders are uniquely regarded as moral lepers, 
in need of constant supervision and forced to the margins of society. The pub-
lic’s fear of persons who have committed crimes of a sexual nature is so ex-
treme that policymakers across jurisdictions have become convinced that tradi-
tional criminal law and sentencing regimes are inadequate to protect public 
safety. Thus, legislatures have adopted a variety of statutes—purportedly civil 
in nature—to manage sex offenders beyond their prison terms. 
Every state and the federal government now maintain a sex offender reg-
istry.4 Typically, registration requirements are triggered by a criminal convic-
tion for a sex-related offense. Individuals required to register must provide 
identifying information about themselves, often including (at a minimum) their 
names, home and work addresses, details about their current physical appear-
ance, and vehicle identification. Registered names and much of the other per-
sonally-identifying information generally are made publicly available. The 
idea is to warn innocent civilians that dangerous sexual predators are in their 
midst. Many states and communities have also enacted residency restrictions 
for convicted sex offenders, which typically prohibit these individuals from 
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living near schools, parks, and other locations where potential victims may be 
present. 
Laws of this type, purportedly civil by their statutory terms, result in the 
inapplicability of the strict constitutional protections ordinarily afforded to 
criminal defendants, despite the laws’ intrusiveness upon individual privacy, 
liberty, and security. Courts have generally found these civil laws constitution-
al as serving the government’s interest in protecting public safety.5 A founda-
tional principle underlying these policies is the assumption that sex offenders 
pose a uniquely high risk of recidivism. In enacting such laws, policymakers 
baldly assert that the need to protect the public justifies the special treatment of 
sex offenders.6 Courts have mostly rubberstamped this assertion without pay-
ing much heed to whether the presumption of future dangerousness is factually 
accurate.7 These decisions align with the perceptions of politicians, the media, 
and the public who have simply taken it on faith that sex offenders pose an 
extreme risk to the public, one that criminal sanctions fail to sufficiently 
thwart.8 
This presumption, however, has little basis in legitimate scientific study. 
In fact, the relevant statistics consistently support just the opposite—i.e., that 
sex offenders are not a singular and exceptional group that poses more than a 
negligible likelihood of sexually reoffending. Judges who ignore this evidence 
are complicit in perpetuating unnecessary, unfair, and arbitrary laws that nega-
tively impede upon the lives of individuals to whom they apply. The Sixth Cir-
cuit’s decision in Snyder therefore represents a transformative venture, opening 
the door for judges to decide important constitutional issues by examining rel-
evant interdisciplinary research findings, to the benefit of defendants and the 
judiciary alike. 
II. SNYDER’S CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 
Michigan’s Sex Offender Registration Act (“SORA”) contains a laundry 
list of both affirmative duties and restrictions on convicted sex offenders.9 In 
brief, SORA requires qualifying sex offenders to register and provide a host of 
personal information. The legislation also significantly restricts where individ-
uals can live, work, and even loiter. A violation of any of the myriad provisions 
                                                                                                                           
 5 See generally MICHAEL L. PERLIN & HEATHER ELLIS CUCULO, 1-5 MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: 
CIVIL AND CRIMINAL § 5–6 (3d ed. 2015) (discussing the history and effects of sex offender registry 
laws in the United States). 
 6 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 290.03(a)(1) (West 2016); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-4002 (2002). 
 7 See, e.g., Gautier v. Jones, 2009 WL 1444533, at *8 (W.D. Okla. May 20, 2009), rev’d on other 
grounds, 364 F. App’x 422 (10th Cir. 2010); Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371, 383 (Ind. 2009). 
 8 See, e.g., Parker v. King, 2008 WL 901087, at *4 (M.D. Ala. Mar. 31, 2008); State v. Trosclair, 
89 So. 3d 340, 351 (La. 2012). 
 9 See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 28.723 et seq. (2011). 
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is itself a criminal offense, carrying a severe penalty, likely involving a new 
prison sentence.10 
In Doe v. Snyder, the anonymous plaintiffs argued that various provisions 
of SORA were unconstitutionally vague, should not be enforced under strict 
liability standards, infringed upon freedom of speech, and hobbled their rights 
to parent, work, and travel.11 In addition, the plaintiffs alleged that any SORA 
requirements enacted after their crimes amount to ex post facto punishments in 
violation of the Constitution.12 At the trial level, the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Michigan found that certain provisions in 
SORA were vague, that offenders could not be held strictly liable for viola-
tions, and that a requirement to register online aliases infringes free speech. 
However, the court did not find that the law imposed an ex post facto punish-
ment.13 The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that, despite being purportedly civ-
il in nature, SORA did embody an ex post facto punishment.14 
Interestingly, the court engaged with originalist arguments in addition to 
modern, empirically driven studies. The Snyder opinion refers twice to the 
Federalist Papers, noting that the Ex Post Facto Clause was part of the “consti-
tutional bulwark in favor of personal security and private rights,”15 and that 
punishment in the guise of civil regulation represented an ugly vestige of tyr-
anny.16 The opinion noted, too, that the Supreme Court in 1810 signaled that 
the framers of the Constitution intended for federal courts to proactively act to 
check state sovereignty when state officials might “punish socially disfavored 
persons without prior notice.”17 To more discretely define what ex post facto 
punishment entails, the Sixth Circuit drew upon the 1798 Supreme Court rul-
ing in Calder v. Bull for the proposition that the Ex Post Facto Clause prohibits 
retroactive punishment.18 
In analyzing whether SORA constituted punishment, the Sixth Circuit drew 
upon several factors enumerated by the Supreme Court in Smith v. Doe, a case 
upholding the constitutionality of Alaska’s sex offender registration law.19 The 
                                                                                                                           
 10 See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 28.729 (2011). 
 11 See Does #1–5 v. Snyder, 834 F.3d 696, 698 (6th Cir. 2016). Based on these grounds, the Sixth 
Circuit declined to rule on the merits of the district court’s other constitutional rulings. See id. at 706. 
However, the court approvingly commented that plaintiffs’ arguments concerning their other constitu-
tional challenges “are far from frivolous and involve matters of great public importance.” See id. 
 12 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 10, cl. 1; Snyder, 834 F.3d at 698. In 2003, in Smith v. Doe, the U.S. Su-
preme Court ruled that Alaska’s sex offender registration law did not constitute an ex post facto pun-
ishment. See 538 U.S. 84, 105–06 (2003). 
 13 See Doe v. Snyder, 101 F. Supp. 3d 722, 727 (E.D. Mich. 2015). 
 14 See Snyder, 834 F.3d at 705–06. 
 15 See id. at 699. (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 44, at 232 (James Madison)). 
 16 See id. at 706 (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 44 (Alexander Hamilton)). 
 17 See id. at 699 (citing Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 137–38 (1810)). 
 18 See id. (citing Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798)). 
 19 See Smith, 538 U.S. 105–06. 
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Sixth Circuit distinguished Michigan’s registry law from the Alaska regime, 
finding Michigan’s law far stricter.20 First, the Sixth Circuit found that SORA’s 
provisions inflict a kind of “banishment” that has been traditionally regarded as 
punishment, as the residency and loitering restrictions make it difficult for sex 
offenders to find places to live and to travel in the course of employment. The 
publication of personal information serves as a traditional shaming punishment. 
In addition, SORA’s multiple regulations resemble criminal parole/probation. 
The court also found that the law imposes an affirmative restraint, as it limits 
where registrants reside, work, and loiter, substantively impeding how they live 
their lives. According to the court, SORA promotes the traditional punitive aims 
of incapacitation, retribution, and deterrence. Finally, the court examined wheth-
er the law had a rational connection to a non-punitive purpose, and whether the 
law was excessive with respect to such purpose. With respect to these last two 
findings, the court drew upon relevant scientific data to bolster its judgment. 
III. THE SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 
In Smith v. Doe, the United States Supreme Court found that Alaska’s sex 
offender registry was necessary for public safety because, it asserted, the recid-
ivism rate of sex offenders is “frightening and high.”21 In Doe v. Snyder, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit was not so convinced that 
the scientific evidence supported this assertion. Instead, the court determined 
that empirical research failed to establish that Michigan’s SORA law was ra-
tionally related to the purpose of protecting public safety. The court looked to a 
statistical study indicating that sex offenders are actually less likely to recidi-
vate than other types of criminals.22 It also referred to other research findings 
that laws such as SORA might in reality disserve their aims by increasing the 
risk of recidivism via barriers they present for registrants to successfully 
reenter society and to secure safe housing and decent jobs.23 
The Sixth Circuit also found SORA excessive in degree. The court ex-
pressed concern that the record contained no scientific support that the multi-
tude of restrictions resulted in greater benefits than the law’s many obvious 
detriments. It specifically took Michigan authorities to task for their failure to 
even study whether registries and residency restrictions actually reduced recid-
                                                                                                                           
 20 See Snyder, 834 F.3d at 700. 
 21 See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 103 (2003) (quoting McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 34 (2002)). 
 22 See Does #1–5 v. Snyder, 834 F.3d 696, 704 (6th Cir. 2016) (citing LAWRENCE A. GREEN-
FIELD, RECIDIVISM OF SEX OFFENDERS RELEASED FROM PRISON IN 1994 (2003)). 
 23 See id. (citing J.J. Prescott & Jonah E. Rockoff, Do Sex Offender Registration and Notification 
Laws Affect Criminal Behavior?, 54 J. L. & ECON. 161, 164 (2011)). 
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ivism.24 In the end, the foregoing factors led the Sixth Circuit to conclude SO-
RA is punitive in nature. 
Indeed, there is evidence that the Supreme Court’s decision in Smith rests 
on specious science. The Smith opinion cited only one earlier Supreme Court 
opinion in the 2002 case of McKune v. Lile to support the proposition that sex 
offenders have a high rate of recidivism. In McKune, a convicted sex offender 
challenged the constitutionality of Kansas’s treatment program for sex offend-
ers.25 The Court deemed Kansas’s scheme appropriate to reduce the “frighten-
ing and high” rate of recidivism among sex offenders.26 The Court’s only data 
put forth in McKune in support of this proposition was a citation to a sex of-
fender treatment article produced by the National Institute of Corrections 
(“NIC”).27 
For its part, the NIC article also did not publish any statistical analysis; 
instead, it referred only to a 1988 article published in a popular trade magazine 
Psychology Today.28 In turn, the Psychology Today piece simply contains the 
following statement: “Most untreated sex offenders released from prison go on 
to commit more offenses – indeed, as many as 80% do.”29 This extreme statis-
tic was not supported by any empirical evidence. The authors were therapists 
in a sex offender treatment program with no apparent academic research cre-
dentials or statistical training.30 Evidently, the authors’ “statistic” was simply 
based on personal observations from their local treatment program.31 This 
makes their offered percentage inherently not generalizable outside of that 
program, meaning that it is scientifically improper to believe it has broader 
applicability. 
In sum, a principal foundation on which the Supreme Court approved the 
existence of specialized sex offender policies rested upon virtually no scientific 
grounds showing that sex offenders are actually at high risk of reoffending. 
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court’s scientifically dubious guidance on the ac-
tual risk of recidivism that sex offenders pose has been unquestionably repeat-
ed by almost all other lower courts that have upheld the public safety need for 
                                                                                                                           
 24 See id. at 705 (“Michigan has never analyzed recidivism rates despite having the data to do 
so.”). 
 25 See McKune, 536 U.S. at 29. 
 26 See id. at 47. 
 27 See id. at 33. 
 28 NAT’L INST. CORR., A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO TREATING THE INCARCERATED MALE SEX 
OFFENDER 44 (Barbara K. Schwartz ed., 1988). 
 29 See Ira Mark Ellman & Tara Ellman, “Frightening and High”: The Supreme Court’s Crucial 
Mistake About Sex Crime Statistics, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 495, 498–99 (2015); Robert E. Freeman-
Longo & R. Wall, Changing a Lifetime of Sexual Crime, PSYCHOL. TODAY, Mar. 1986, at 58. 
 30 See Ellman & Ellman, supra note 29 at 498. 
 31 See id. 
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targeted sex offender restrictions.32 The Sixth Circuit panel in Snyder does not 
make that same mistake. 
IV. SNYDER’S TRANSFORMATIVE EFFECTS 
Snyder’s engagement with scientific evidence has the potential to change 
the jurisprudence surrounding sex offender laws. Doe v. Snyder cannot be dis-
missed on ideologically liberal grounds: the judge who wrote the opinion, ap-
pointed by President George H.W. Bush, is considered conservative.33 Shortly 
after the Snyder opinion issued, the Eleventh Circuit published a ruling regard-
ing a challenge to Florida’s sex offender residency restriction act and recogniz-
es Snyder.34 The Eleventh Circuit reversed the lower court’s summary dismis-
sal of the suit because two of the plaintiffs had raised plausible claims that it 
was an ex post facto law. As this opinion acknowledges, such statistics illus-
trate that the law’s lifetime residency restrictions may be excessive in relation 
to the need to protect public safety.35 Similarly, a district court opinion issued 
in December 2016 finding Indiana’s sex offender restrictions to be an ex post 
facto law cites Snyder and refers to statistical measurements of recidivism risk 
as being a relevant inquiry.36 There, the judge found the law to be excessive 
since there was no effort to assess the likelihood of reoffending that was par-
ticularized to the individual.37 
Other litigators have evidently taken notice of the Sixth Circuit’s interest 
in Snyder in engaging the empirical literature. For example, lawyers recently 
filed suit challenging Idaho’s registry statute on numerous constitutional 
grounds, including an ex post facto challenge.38 Their strategy is likewise to 
provide support from interdisciplinary research circles for the various ways 
that public registries fail to protect the public because of the already low recid-
ivism rate of sex offenders.39 
On another front, in November 2016, the Fourth Circuit found a provision 
of North Carolina’s sex offender residency restriction law unconstitutional.40 
That case was not based on the Ex Post Facto Clause, but the case is still rele-
                                                                                                                           
 32 See, e.g., Clark v. Ryan, 836 F.3d 1013, 1018 (9th Cir. 2016); Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 721 
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 33 See Jack Lessenberry, Politics & Prejudices: How About a Financial Offender List?, DETROIT 
METRO TIMES (Aug. 31, 2016), http://www.metrotimes.com/detroit/politics-and-prejudices-how-
about-a-financial-offender-list/Content?oid=2462658 [https://perma.cc/3KKP-RH6J]. 
 34 Doe v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 1303, at *5 (11th Cir. Jan. 25, 2017). 
 35 See id. at *8. 
 36 See Valenti v. Hartford City, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 165618, at *22 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 1, 2016). 
 37 See id. 
 38 Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief at 61, Does v. Wasden, No. 1:16-cv-00429-
BLW (D. Idaho Sept. 22, 2016). 
 39 See id. at 50. 
 40 Doe v. Cooper, 842 F.3d 833, 847 (4th Cir. 2016). 
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vant because the court expressly looked for scientific evidence that the law 
served public safety.41 The court found the residency restriction to be over-
broad because it prohibited individuals from visiting a variety of public places 
where people tend to exercise their First Amendment rights.42 Significantly, the 
state had declined to offer any scientific evidence or data that sex offenders 
pose a high risk of reoffending.43 The district judge and the appellate panel 
both expressed their consternation that the state’s representatives chose instead 
to argue that it was simply “common sense” to realize that sex offenders would 
likely reoffend.44 Thus, these new cases following the publication of Snyder 
already provide hints of a sea change in constitutional decision-making, fueled 
by a new emphasis upon empirically-led analysis. 
Because Snyder is among the first cases to negatively assess civil sex of-
fender laws, some commentators speculate that the Supreme Court may now 
be interested enough to grant certiorari in the Snyder case to resolve the con-
flict.45 Shortly after the Sixth Circuit’s ruling, the State of Michigan formally 
requested that the Supreme Court stay the effect of the Snyder ruling.46 The 
state’s request was swiftly rejected, presumably because there was either not a 
substantial question or because there was no good cause for the stay as re-
quired by the appellate procedural rule permitting a stay of a lower court or-
der.47 This rejection suggests there may be some interest by the high court to 
revisit the efficacy of sex offender policies that operate alongside the normal 
criminal adjudicative process. The stage may already be set. The State of 
Michigan recently filed a petition for certiorari, specifically noting the very 
recent splits among federal and state courts on the constitutionality of sex of-
fender civil laws.48 
CONCLUSION 
Several commentators have noted the importance of Doe v. Snyder for 
challenging “civil” sex offender legal regimes. Professor Doug Berman, a 
                                                                                                                           
 41 See id. at 846–47. 
 42 See id. at 845. 
 43 See id. at 846–47. 
 44 See id. 
 45 See Andrew Fleischman, Sixth Circuit: Michigan’s Sex Offender Registry Is Punitive, MIMESIS 
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2016/08/27/the-6th-circuit-finally-said-the-magic-word-punitive/ [https://perma.cc/B3N6-N5J5]. 
 46 See Justice Denies Michigan’s Appeal to Halt Sex Offender Ruling, WZZM (Nov. 15, 2016, 
11:18 AM), http://www.wzzm13.com/news/local/michigan/justice-denies-michigans-appeal-to-halt-
sex-offender-ruling/352369233 [https://perma.cc/A93M-HFCK]. 
 47 See id.; see also FED. R. APP. P. 41(d)(2)(A); SUP. CT. R. 23. 
 48 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Snyder v. Does #1–5, 2016 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 4621 
(2016) (No. 16-768). 
42 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 58:E. Supp. 
well-known sentencing law and policy blogger, labels the Sixth Circuit’s ruling 
“significant.”49 A Slate reporter calls it a “vitally important” decision that 
rightfully conceptualized such laws as “unconstitutional monstrosities.”50 Sim-
ilarly, a commentator at Reason magazine indicates that the opinion reasonably 
recognizes that these sex offender laws are simply “stupid” and that “the court 
offered a scathing assessment that suggests such laws make little sense.”51 
Snyder is a shining example of a court actually engaging with scientific 
evidence that refutes moralized judgments about a particularly disfavored 
group. Equally important, a reasonable interpretation of the Sixth Circuit’s 
opinion by many is that more of Michigan’s civil sex offender law, and other 
state laws like it, are now subject to a broader invalidation.52 Time will soon 
tell whether this specific case attracts the attention of the Supreme Court and 
its willingness to revisit its mistaken assumptions about the dangerousness of 
sex offenders collectively. Yet, whether or not the Supreme Court does so in 
the near future, the effect of the Snyder decision on the engagement of scien-
tific data in constitutional analysis has already been influential. 
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